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STATEMENT OF INTEREST
The Utah Association for Justice ("UAJ") is a statewide organization comprised of
attorneys committed to protecting the rights of persons who have been injured in their
person or property, and who turn to the courts for judicial redress. In promoting these
interests, UAJ seeks to preserve a fair, prompt, open and efficient administration of
justice.
UAJ members represent injured people in the vast majority of personal injury tort
actions in this state. The Court's decision on what jury instructions are appropriate based
on evidence of a tort victim having a preexisting condition that is symptomatic compared
to a preexisting condition that is asymptomatic will impact virtually every one of those
actions, as well as future personal injury litigation. Thus, the resolution of this case
significantly impacts not only the parties to this action, but also thousands of tort victims
throughout the state of Utah.

STANDARD OF REVIEW AND STATEMENT OF THE CASE
As amicus curiae, the Utah Association for Justice refers to the Standard of
Review and Statement of the Case as set forth by Plaintiff/Respondent, and incorporates
them as if set forth fully herein.
ISSUES PRESENTED
This Court granted certiorari on the following issues:
1.

Whether the court of appeals erred in holding there was insufficient evidence to
support an apportionment-to-preexisting -conditions jury instruction.

1
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2.

Whether the court of appeals erred in holding the apportionment instruction
required evidence of a symptomatic preexisting condition on the "date of the
accident."

3.

Whether the court of appeals erred in holding the apportionment instruction
affected the outcome of the trial.

4.

Whether Biswell v. Duncan, 743 P. 2d 80 (Utah App. 1987) states the correct legal
standard.
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT
UAJ's brief will not address the case-specific questions (one and three) but will

only address the issues that have broader application (two and four). Biswell v. Duncan,
743 P.2d 80 (Utah App. 1987) states the correct legal standard as applied to
asymptomatic plaintiffs.1 A defendant is liable for the entire harm caused to a plaintiff
with an asymptomatic condition because, "but for" the tortfeasor's negligence, the
plaintiff would not have had any pain or treatment due to the condition whatsoever.
The Court of Appeals, in determining that Plaintiff Harris was not symptomatic on
the "date of the accident" and therefore a jury instruction instructing the jury on
symptomatic preexisting conditions was inappropriate, indicated that Harris' preexisting
complaints were taken care of "by the time of the accident." The question of how long a
plaintiff must be free from symptoms in order to declare a preexisting condition resolved
or "taken care o f was not directly before the Court of Appeals in this case, as the
uncontested evidence shows that Harris was asymptomatic for several years prior to the
accident at issue.
1. For purposes of this brief, the UAJ will refer to plaintiffs with latent, dormant or
asymptomatic preexisting conditions (as opposed to preexisting injuries that caused pain
or disability) at the time of the accident as "asymptomatic plaintiffs."
2
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Whether a plaintiff has a preexisting condition that was asymptomatic versus
symptomatic at the time of the injury-causing event should be determined in two stages.
First, the trial court should make a pretrial determination of whether the defendant can
present sufficient evidence that the plaintiff was symptomatic within a sufficiently close
period of time prior to the injury-causing event. If the defendant does not have sufficient
evidence to present that the plaintiff was symptomatic within a sufficiently close period
of time prior to the injury-causing event, then introducing evidence of any prior accidents
or preexisting conditions would be irrelevant and unduly prejudicial. If the trial court
believes that the defendant has sufficient evidence that the plaintiff was symptomatic
within a sufficiently close period of time prior to the injury-causing event, then the matter
should go to the jury to decide whether the plaintiff was symptomatic prior to the
accident. See Ortiz v. Geneva Rock Prods., 939 P.2d 1213, 1220 n.5 (Utah App. 1997)
(noting that both instructions for a symptomatic condition and an asymptomatic condition
were given when the evidence was disputed as to whether plaintiffs condition was
asymptomatic).
ARGUMENT
I.

BlSWELL IS A CORRECT STATEMENT OF THE LAW AS APPLIED TO
ASYMPTOMATIC PLAINTIFFS.

This Court should clarify that while a jury must try to apportion an aggravation of
a preexisting symptomatic condition, a tortfeasor is fully liable for all of the damages
caused by an injury to a plaintiff with a preexisting asymptomatic condition. The
asymptomatic/symptomatic distinction is found in Tingey v. Christensen, 1999 UT 68,

3
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If 15, 987 P.2d 588 and Biswell v. Duncan, 742 P.2d 80, 88 (Utah Ct. App. 1987). In
Tingey, this Court held that "if the jury can find a reasonable basis for apportioning
damages between a preexisting condition and a subsequent tort, it should do so; however,
if the jury finds it impossible to apportion damages, it should find that the tortfeasor is
liable for the entire amount of damages." Tingey, 1999 UT 68 at \ 15. While this Court
did not expressly make a symptomatic/asymptomatic distinction in Tingey, the Court
noted that the plaintiff was symptomatic at the time of the accident and was receiving
ongoing pain management treatment for numerous injuries, including a visit less than a
month before the crash to a pain clinic during which she complained of severe pain. In
Biswell, the Court of Appeals addressed injuries to a plaintiff with a preexisting
asymptomatic condition and held that when the tortfeasor's negligence causes an injury
to a person with a preexisting asymptomatic condition or one to which the injured person
is predisposed, "the defendant is liable to the injured person for the full amount of
damages which ensue, notwithstanding such diseased or weakened condition." Biswell,
742P.2dat88.
The difference in the rules set forth in Tingey and Biswell is that Tingey applies to
an aggravation of a symptomatic condition, while Biswell applies to a preexisting \
asymptomatic condition that is activated by the accident.2 Courts and commentators have

2. It appears that ShopKo contends that Biswell is not a correct statement of the law
because it removed "the aggravation element." {See Br. Pet'r 21-22.) Biswell is clear that
liability is found only "when a defendant's negligence aggravates or lights up a latent,
dormant, or asymptomatic condition." Biswell, 742 P.2d at 88 (emphasis added). This
statement of the law is substantively identical to the rule in Brunson v. Strong, 412 P.2d
451, 453 (Utah 1966) (holding plaintiff is entitled to recover damages "including any

4
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noted the distinction between the application of the "eggshell plaintiff rule" to plaintiffs
with a symptomatic preexisting condition and those with a dormant or latent condition.
"[C]ourts note a distinction between an asymptomatic or latent condition—for which the
defendant is entirely liable—and a preexisting symptomatic condition which requires
apportionment, if possible." Deirdre M. Smith, The Disordered and Discredited Plaintiff:
Psychiatric Evidence in Civil Litigation, 31 Cardozo L. Rev. 749, 761 (2010); see also 2
Jacob A Stein, Stein on Personal Injury Damages § 11:1 (3d ed. 1997) (noting the
difference between the application of the eggshell plaintiff rule to plaintiffs with
asymptomatic preexisting conditions and plaintiffs with preexisting conditions being
actively treated at the time of the accident); Rachel V. Rose, et al., Another Crack in the
Thin Skull Plaintiff Rule, 10 Tex. J. Women & L. 165, 182 (2011) (noting that the
distinction between symptomatic and asymptomatic preexisting conditions is important
because defendant is liable for all harm to a latent condition but only for the aggravation
if the condition was symptomatic); Candice E. Renka, The Presumed Eggshell Plaintiff
Rule: Determining Liability When Mental Harm Accompanies Physical Injury, 29 T.
Jefferson L. Rev. 289,298 (2007) (noting that defendant is liable for any resulting harm
if he activates a latent condition but only liable for the aggravation if the condition is
symptomatic at the time of the accident).
As noted by the Utah Court of Appeals, the distinction is found in the two
different model jury instructions addressing preexisting conditions: (1) "aggravation of

aggravation or lighting up of such a preexisting condition"), which ShopKo notes is the
correct rule of law and contains "the core causal element." {See Br. Pet'r 21.)

5
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symptomatic preexisting conditions" and (2) "dormant preexisting conditions." See
Harris v. ShopKo Stores, Inc., 2011 UT App 329, \ 18, 263 P.3d 1184 (referencing MUJI
2d CV2018 and CV2019). Other jurisdictions follow a similar approach when
distinguishing between symptomatic and asymptomatic preexisting conditions.
The Washington Supreme Court noted the symptomatic/asymptomatic distinction
in Harris v. Drake, 99 P.3d 872 (Wash. 2004). With facts similar to this case, the court
upheld a trial court's directed verdict for the plaintiff on causation when the defense
failed to show that a preexisting condition was symptomatic "prior to the accident." Id. at
878. The court explained that "when an accident lights up and makes active a preexisting
condition that was dormant and asymptomatic immediately prior to the accident, the
preexisting condition is not a proximate cause of the resulting damages'" Id. (emphasis
added) (citing Bennett v. Messick, 457 P.2d 609, 612 (1969)).3
The Iowa Supreme Court has also noted that the tortfeasor is liable for the full
injury when the injury is superimposed upon an asymptomatic condition. In Sleeth v.
Louvar, 659 N.W.2d 210 (Iowa 2003), the court noted the conflict presented by the rule
applicable to an aggravation of a symptomatic injury (as in Tingey) and the rule
applicable to an injury involving an asymptomatic condition (as in Biswell). Id. at 211-12.
The court characterized the two rules as (1) the aggravation rule and (2) the eggshell
plaintiff rule. Id. The aggravation rule, it explained, applies when a preexisting condition

3. The Utah Court of Appeals relied upon Bennett v. Messick in its opinion in
Biswell See Biswell, 742 P.2d at 88.
6
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was symptomatic and caused some sort of disability prior to the accident, and the
eggshell plaintiff rule applied when the condition was asymptomatic. Id.
In Sleeth, the plaintiff had asymptomatic arthritis in her knee when she was in a
car crash and injured her knee. Id. at 211. Her friends, coworkers, and family testified
that she had never complained of pain in her knee prior to the accident and that she was
very active. Id. at 214-15. Over the plaintiffs objections, the trial court gave both the
aggravation rule and the eggshell plaintiff rule to the jury. Id. at 212. As there "was no
substantial evidence of preexisting disability" to the plaintiff at the time of the injurycausing event, the court held that it was error to give the aggravation (Tingey) jury
instruction and that the trial court should have only given the eggshell (Biswell)
instruction. Id. at 216; see also Becker v. D&E Distributing Co., 247 N.W.2d 727 (Iowa
1976) (holding that because a plaintiffs prior foot condition was "not disabling in any
way" before the accident caused by the defendant, the defendant was liable for the full
extent of those injuries).
Several other jurisdictions have made similar conclusions. The Hawaii Supreme
Court held that there should be no apportionment of damages if a person was fully
recovered from a preexisting injury or condition at the time of an accident. "In such
circumstances, [the tortfeasor] should be liable for the entire damages." Bachran v.
Morishige, 469 P.2d 808, 811 (Hawaii 1970). The court distinguished the fully recovered
plaintiff from one who was still experiencing pain or who was disabled from a prior
injury at the time of an accident. If the plaintiff was still experiencing pain at the time of
the accident, "then damages should be apportioned." Id. at 812. The Texas Supreme
7
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Court held that an aggravation instruction (Tingey) should only be given if the plaintiff
had a symptomatic preexisting condition before the crash and similar pain after the crash
due to the injury, creating an intermingling of pain. See Dallas Ry. & Terminal Co. v.
O/r, 215 S.W.2d 862, 864 (Tex. 1948). The Arizona Supreme Court also held that it was
not proper to give an aggravation instruction {Tingey) when the plaintiff had a dormant
condition involving "an anatomically different spine than that of a 'normal' person."
Scottsdale v. Kokaska, 495 P.2d 1327, 1335 (Ariz. 1972). Thus, courts of various
jurisdictions have upheld the rationale supporting the sound ruling issued in BiswelL
The Biswell rule is not only rationale and equitable, but it is also supported by
sound public policy. Holding tortfeasors liable for the full damages suffered by an
asymptomatic plaintiff is logical because, but for the tortfeasor's negligence, the
asymptomatic plaintiff would not have had any pain and would not have been forced to
seek medical treatment. In other words, in the absence of the tortfeasor's negligence, an
asymptomatic plaintiff would not have experienced pain and suffering or incurred
medical expenses at all.4
Even though an asymptomatic plaintiff might have greater damages than a person
without an asymptomatic preexisting condition, courts and commentators agree that the

4. The Delaware Supreme Court explained that, under tort law, if a plaintiff had a
preexisting disposition to a certain physical or emotional injury which had not manifested
itself prior to the time of the accident, an injury attributable to the accident is
compensable if the injury would not have occurred but for the accident. The accident
need not be the sole cause or even the substantial cause of the injury. If the accident
provides the "setting" or "trigger," causation is satisfied for purposes of compensability.
Reese v. Home Budget Center, 619 A.2d 907, 910 (Del. 1993).
8
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more susceptible to injury. William C. Shiel, Jr., Degenerative Disc Disease and Sciatica,
MedicineNet.com, http://medicinenet.com/degenerative_disc/article.htm (last visited May
29, 2012). It should not be surprising that older people have more fragile spines and
many will have discs that have started to degenerate due to age. Similarly, nurses,
farmers, mechanics, and construction workers will have spines and joints that have begun
to degenerate due to wear and tear from active physical jobs. Finally, those who maintain
an active lifestyle such as campers, hikers, bikers, fisherman, runners, etc. will likely
have more wear and tear on their joints due to their active lifestyle. Thus, the dormant
"condition" that would be apportioned, absent Biswell, is the plaintiffs age, sex,
occupation, or lifestyle. Apportioning damages in such a way would penalize people for
simply growing old, choosing a certain job, or choosing an active lifestyle. The Biswell
rule is not only the correct statement of the law, but also an equitable rule, as it holds the
tortfeasor responsible for the damages that, but for his or her negligence, the plaintiff
would not have suffered.
II.

THE COURT OF APPEALS CORRECTLY DETERMINED THAT THERE WAS
INSUFFICIENT EVIDENCE TO SUBMIT THE QUESTION OF WHETHER HARRIS WAS
SUFFERING FROM A SYMPTOMATIC PREEXISTING CONDITION ON THE "DATE OF
THE ACCIDENT" TO THE JURY.

The Court of Appeals' decision indicated that a tortfeasor is liable for all damages
caused to a plaintiff who has a dormant condition if the plaintiffs condition was
asymptomatic on the date of the accident. See Harris, 2011 UT App 329 at f 22. After
looking at the evidence marshaled by Harris and conducting its own review of the record,
The Court of Appeals concluded that the uncontested evidence was that Harris5
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court erred in submitting the issue of apportionment to the jury. Id at T)" 23. The Court of
Appeals' decision was correct on. the merits and suggests the proper procedure for trial

are symptomatic is in dispute.
Before submitting the issue of apportionment to the jury, an initial determination
must be made regarding whether there is sufficient e vddence that a plaintiff w as
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this determination as there was no evidence presenk u iim. * lurr. * niui sui;oreG ir.>m
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Prods., 939 P.2d 1213 (Utah App. ! 997) and noted that Ortiz rejected plaintiffs claim
that evidence of his preexisting conditions was irrelevant because there was some
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trial court's ruling admitting evidence of a preexisting condition because there was
evidence presented by a doctor that the preexisting condition was not latent at the time of

asymptomatic condition were given because there was conflicting evidence as to whether
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plaintiffs condition was latent. Ortiz, 939 P.2d at 1220 n.5. The Court of Appeals'
decision suggests that the jury should make the determination as to whether a condition
was symptomatic or asymptomatic if there was some evidence that a condition was not
latent during the time leading up to the accident.
This approach is consistent with the law in other jurisdictions. In reviewing case
law and authority from other jurisdictions, it does not appear that a bright-line test has
been established indicating how long a plaintiff must be asymptomatic before a jury
cannot reasonably conclude that the condition was symptomatic. Rather, it appears that
this issue must be looked at on a case-by-case basis. In Hoskins v. Reich, the Washington
Court of Appeals looked at whether the evidence showed that the plaintiff was
symptomatic "immediately" before an accident. See Hoskins v. Reich, \1A P.3d 1250
(Wash. App. 2008). The court held that the trial court erred in admitting evidence of preaccident conditions when plaintiff was asymptomatic for the "weeks and months
immediately before this accident." Id. at 568.
In approaching a case where there is a dispute as to the question of whether
damages may be apportioned between the injuries caused by the tortfeasor and
preexisting conditions, the trial court should exercise its gatekeeper function by
determining whether evidence of preexisting conditions or a prior accident is relevant to a
determination of whether the condition was symptomatic prior to the injury-causing
event. If the evidence does not support a finding that a plaintiff was suffering from a
symptomatic preexisting condition on the date of the accident, the trial court should
exclude evidence of prior accidents (i.e. auto accidents, slip and falls, workers
12
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because the evidence cannot support a finding that the condition was symptomatic. If a
genuine dispute exists, then, like Ortiz, the jury can be given both the symptomatic and
asymptoi natic instri ictions
CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons 1//U respectfully requests ma: this "!ourt recognize
ov.vv.t.. ana nngey both contain *;K ^orrc: icga. ;;iaiiuaid
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